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TOWARD THE FORMATION OF A PARTISAN 
ALIGNMENT IN FRANCE 
Roy Pierce 
This article investigates the extent to which and the ways in which a basic partisan align- 
ment appeared to be forming in France between 1958 and 1988. During that period, the 
incidence of party identification rose from abnormally low to normal levels, and the com- 
position of the alignment evolved from indeterminacy, through a left-right standoff, to 
Socialist party predominance. The basic question asked is how a partisan alignment is 
created in the J~rst place. The main elements of the answer suggested are by simplifying, 
clarifying, and stabilizing the terms of electoral choice. This process is traced closely, 
with special reference to the incidence of PI and the composition of the alignment by age 
in 1988, and including a comparison between France in 1968 and the U.S. in 1932. Fi- 
nally, the fragility of the 1988 alignment is underscored. Comparatively new and shaped 
mainly by the partisan identifications of the younger citizens, the 1988 alignment was 
vulnerable to any weakening of the conditions that contributed to creating it. The party 
with the most to lose was the Socialist party, which had gained the most while the party 
system stabilized and the incidence of party identification rose. 
The purpose of this article is to investigate the extent to which, and the 
ways in which, a basic partisan alignment appeared to be forming within 
the French electorate during the thirty years between 1958 and 1988. 
The implications of the subject are twofold. On the one hand, our inves- 
tigation will shed light on the relationship between French mass partisan 
orientations and the structure of the French party system. During most of 
the postwar era, the French party system, by virtually any measure, has 
been highly unstable. Whether  one considers the life expectancy of legisla- 
tive electoral parties and parliamentary groups, or the volatility of legisla- 
tive electoral results, the French party system has displayed a high degree 
of inconstancy. In more recent years, however, there have been signs of at 
least some dampening of what Charles de Gaulle referred to in 1946 as 
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"France's perpetual political effervescence." The symptoms of political in- 
stability have certainly not disappeared from France, but for the two dec- 
ades prior to the presidential and legislative elections of 1988, the party 
system displayed a rare degree of both clarity and continuity. Stability at 
the level of the party system should both promote and reflect stability in 
underlying mass partisan attachments. 
On the other hand, while the literature pertaining to party identification 
is enormous, there has been virtually no empirical investigation of how a 
partisan alignment is created in the first place, at least in contemporary 
conditions. We of course know in a broad sense, on the basis of numerous 
historical studies, and as systematized ibr Western Europe by Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967), a great deal about the relationship between parties and 
basic social cleavages. We know less about the processes by which those 
social cleavages become translated into specific partisan attachments. 
Studies of party identification include analyses of both historical and pre- 
sumably current cases of "realignment" or "dealignment,'" but these share 
the common assumption that there was some ongoing partisan alignment 
already present from which elements of the electorate could, in changed 
circumstances, distance themselves. Such studies all ask the question: How 
does an electorate move from one kind of partisan alignment to another? In 
this article, I ask the question: How does an electorate move from what is 
virtually no partisan alignment at all to an alignment that appears to be at 
least minimally capable of both stabilizing the allocation of the mass parti- 
san vote and setting limits to the capacity of political elites to recast the 
shape of the party system by splitting old parties or forming new ones? In 
that fashion, this paper will wed local French political phenomena to the 
theory" of elections that centers around the core concept of part), identifica- 
tion. 
MASS PARTISAN ATTACHMENTS AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 
France seems to hold the world record for electoral volatility. Mair 
(1989) reports that France not only experienced more high-volatility elec- 
tions during the post-World War II period than any other country sur- 
veyed, but it also had the most high-volatility elections during the entire 
century between 1885 and 1985. The long-term character of that pattern 
should be a powerful caution against attributing too much importance to 
contrary phenomena that may turn out to be short-lived. We will be sensi- 
tive to that danger. That does not mean, however, that we should simply 
brush aside whatever opposing data come our way. 
It is important to keep in mind that this characteristic electoral volatility 
is less the result of inconstancy in the partisan choices of French voters 
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than of the propensity of French political elites to alter the terms of what 
Lancelot (1986, p. 20) has labeled the "political supply." Converse and 
Pierce (1986) have shown that despite the French record of high net aggre- 
gate instability, when one controls for the constancy of partisan (or candi- 
date) offerings from one electoral period to the next, French voters do not 
appear to be any more fickle in their electoral choices than their U.S. coun- 
terparts, and in some situations they are actually more loyal politically than 
comparably situated U.S. voters. 
The high-volatility postwar elections identified by Mair (1989) were the 
legislative elections of 1951, 1956, 1958, and 1962. There were surely some 
large gross shifts in electoral support for the same party during those years, 
such as the drop in the proportion of the vote for the Communist party 
from 1956 to 1958, and the gain in the vote for the Gaullists in 1968 rela- 
tive to 1967. But the period also witnessed numerous changes in the terms 
of electoral choice presented to the voters, of which the most destabilizing 
were almost surely the successive incarnations of the Gaullist party, but 
also including the formation of such purely temporary, electoral organiza- 
tions as the Poujadists and Pierre Mend~s-France's Republican Front. 
The implications of this unceasing tinkering by the elites with the nature 
of the electoral alternatives offered to the voters for the breadth and depth 
of mass linkages with the parties were only tangentially appreciated during 
the early part of the period. Williams (1964, pp. 151-152) raised the issue 
of the electoral worth of the party label during the Fourth Republic, but 
only in the context of maintaining party discipline among Conservatives in 
Parliament. An IFOP poll conducted in 1952 (Sondages, 1952) highlighted 
the limited extent to which French voters had confidence in the parties for 
which they reported voting at the most recent election. Another IFOP poll 
(Fougeyrollas, 1963, p. 180) carried out in 1956 indicated that more than 40 
percent of the electorate either would not or could not name a party or 
political group that answered their needs. It was not until Converse and 
Dupeux (1962) reported on the comparatively low incidence of party identi- 
fication in France, as revealed at surveys conducted in connection with the 
1958 legislative elections, and linked it with the potentiality ]br mass elec- 
toral support for "flash" parties, that the reciprocal relationship between 
the instability of the French party system and the comparatively under- 
developed nature of French partisan attachments could be understood. 
During the late 1950s, the mass-elite electoral connection in France was 
confined in a circuitous pattern from which there could be no quick or easy 
escape. Only about half of the electorate was relatively firmly anchored to 
an existing political party. The remaining half was accessible to whichever 
parties were most attractive to individual voters at any given electoral mo- 
ment. ~ New parties, which were rarely in short supply, could count on a 
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large pool of potential supporters, and existing parties--particularly but 
not exclusively those on the right and in the center of the spectrum--were 
constantly under threat. The reserve army of new voters, combined with 
unattached older ones, produced a continuing supply of electoral recruits 
for France's political entrepreneurs. These, however, did not always give 
their newfound followers the opportunity to vote for their parties twice in a 
row, with the result that a party's electoral gains at one election were dissi- 
pated at the following one. Charles de Gaulle's RPF (Rassemblement du 
Peuple Frangais ) halved the electoral strength of the MRP (Mouvement 
Rdpublicain Populaire) in 1951 but no longer existed in 1956, while the 
Poujadists won almost 12 percent of the votes in 1956 but fielded only a 
handful of candidates in 1958. 
At the same time as the large number of unattached French voters pro- 
vided mass support for new parties, the unstinting efforts of the political 
elites to create them undermined the likelihood that the incidence and 
intensification of party identification would grow at more than a snail's 
pace. The kaleidoscopic character of the party system meant that there 
were few stable partisan referents. Only the traditional leftist parties, the 
Communists, Socialists, and Radical-Socialists, had the longevity and conti- 
nuity of nomenclature and symbolism to be enduring objects of psychologi- 
cal attachment. Except for those parties, the possibility of intergenerational 
transmission of partisanship was virtually suspended. The endemic discon- 
tinuity of partisan offerings weakened the probability that freshly acquired 
partisan identifications would become reinforced through repeated expres- 
sion. The underdeveloped status of party identification in France rewarded 
the efforts of partisan innovators, and those efforts in turn ensured that 
partisan identifications would not easily multiply or intensify. 
At the outset of the French Fifth Republic, therefore, the incidence of 
party identification was so limited and the party system so fluid that it 
hardly makes any sense to speak of the existence at that time of some 
partisan alignment based on enduring party allegiances. The electorate was 
so heavily populated with citizens without any abiding party attachments 
that electoral outcomes could be expected to be affected as much by other 
factors as they were by partisan loyalties. Party identifications would have 
to become more numerous and more firmly implanted before it would be 
possible to talk about a partisan alignment in France. 
The main condition for the diffusion and intensification of partisanship at 
the mass level was modification of the party system in the direction of 
simplification and stability. Developments consistent with those outcomes 
did in fact occur during the Fifth Republic. As a result, the incidence of 
party identification increased, at first slowly, and later, almost surely, more 
rapidly. By the late 1980s, the incidence of party identification in France 
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had risen to the level that Converse (1969) had determined to be charac- 
teristic of a mature party system. With approximately the same proportion 
of the electorate identifying with a party in France as normally do in the 
other developed democracies for which we have the relevant data, it has 
become possible to speak of the existence of a given partisan alignment. 
The remainder of this paper will chart the rise in the incidence of party 
identification in France, analyze the political composition of the newly 
formed partisan alignment, and assess the probability that this alignment 
will endure. 
THE EMERGENCE OF A PARTISAN ALIGNMENT 
There is no longitudinal record of abiding partisan attachments in France 
comparable to the series of measurements of party identification contained 
in the United States National Election Studies or the equivalent studies 
that have been conducted elsewhere, notably in the Scandinavian coun- 
tries. There are, of course, numerous studies that purport to measure party 
identification in France, but these invariably provide the respondents with 
a list of parties from which they are asked to choose. This interviewing 
technique inflates the proportion of respondents claiming to identify with a 
party, at the same time as it prevents expression of the idiosyncratic re- 
sponses that an open-ended question permits. Converse and Pierce (1986, 
pp. 58-61) have shown that in 1967 the median number of parties that the 
French electorate could spontaneously recall was less than four. When re- 
spondents were shown a list of ten parties, however, the number that they 
could recognize was larger. It does not seem to be unreasonable to count as 
true identifiers only those people who can spontaneously recall the name of 
the party to which they claim to be habitually close? 
In order to ensure the maximum degree of cross-time continuity in 
measurement of party identification in France, we will rely here only on 
three studies: the Converse/Dupeux study of 1958, to which we have al- 
ready referred; the Converse/Pierce study conducted during the late 1960s 
(Converse and Pierce, 1986, Chap. 3); and a postpresidential election sur- 
vey conducted by SOFRES for the author in 1988, in connection with a 
larger study of presidential selection in France and the United States.' The 
basic question employed in 1958, which was formulated by Georges Dup- 
eux, was "Quel est le parti dont vous vous sentez le plus proche?" (Which 
party do you feel closest to?) For the Converse/Pierce surveys of the late 
1960s, the word habituellement was inserted, so that the question read, 
"Which party do you usually feel closest to?" That same question wording 
was retained {br the 1988 survey. The questions were completely open- 
ended. The respondents were given the opportunity to cite any party or 
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group they wished, in their own words, without prompting or the use of 
aids of any kind. 5 
We have already recalled that in the late 1950s, the incidence of party 
identification in France was so low--some twenty percentage points less 
than it was at the same era in the United States (Converse and Dupeux, 
1962)--that it would be futile to think in terms of there being some parti- 
san alignment operative at the time. By the late 1960s, that comparatively 
low level had risen slightly, although the convulsive events of May 1968 
produced some sharp discontinuities between the levels registered at the 
legislative elections of spring 1967 and summer 1968. Nevertheless, the 
direct indications that the incidence of party identification had increased 
over the previous decade, combined with ancillary evidence indicating that 
more French children were being socialized politically than had previously 
been the case, led Converse and Pierce (1986, Chap. 3) to the cautious 
conclusion that the incidence of partisanship would increase still further in 
the future. 
Our postelectoral survey of 1988 furnishes decisive evidence that such a 
development did in fact occur during the intervening two decades. Some 
71 percent of the respondents reported a discrete partisan identification, a 
value that fully matches those reported ~br strict party identifiers (i.e., ex- 
cluding leaners) in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s, against 
which the earlier French levels had seemed paltry, and even slightly ex- 
ceeds U.S. proportions during the 1980s. 
The incidence of party identification recorded in 1988 suggests strongly 
that France had by then, and possibly even earlier, reached the equilib- 
rium level of mass partisanship that Converse (1969, p. 146) had estimated 
to be slightly more than 70 percent of the electorate. ~ This result is doubly 
satisfying. On the one hand, it can be taken as a confirmation of the validity 
of Converse's model of the intergenerational transmission of partisanship. 
On the other hand, it reinforces our confidence in the findings of our 1988 
survey. The level of partisanship recorded for France in 1988 was just 
about what it should have been. 7 Between 1958 and 1988, therefore, the 
incidence of partisanship in France rose to a level typical of democracies 
with mature party systems, in effect embracing as large a proportion of the 
electorate as can probabitistically be expected to identify with a party. 
At file same time as the incidence of partisanship rose, the contours of 
the political alignment it reflected also underwent significant change. If it is 
not realistic to conceive of a basic partisan alignment during the late 1950s, 
it is reasonable to think in such terms for the late 1960s, when party identi- 
fications were more widespread than they had been earlier. The underlying 
political balance at that time was such that leftist and rightist party identi- 
fiers were virtually equal in numbers. A decade of Gaullist rule after 1958 
had made the Gaullist party the beneficiary of more identifiers than any 
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other single party enjoyed, but the Communist and Socialist parties com- 
bined, in more or less equal proportions, attracted more support than the 
Gaullist party did. The distribution of partisanship throughout the electo- 
rate was such that it could not be said, in 1967, that either leftists or right- 
ists enjoyed any underlying, long-term electoral advantage. The closeness 
of the 1967 legislative elections reflected the even balance of left-right par- 
tisan attachments, 
The configuration of partisan attachments was very different in 1988, 
when, as we have seen, these were also more numerous than they had 
been two decades earlier. In 1988, the underlying partisan alignment 
strongly favored the leftist parties in general and the Socialist party in par- 
ticular. More than 40 percent of our 1988 sample electorate identified with 
a left-wing party in 1988, while only some 30 percent identified with a 
rightist party. The leftists, however, were overwhelmingly attached to the 
Socialist party, while the rightists divided their allegiances between the 
neo-Gaullist RPR (Rassemblement pour la R6publique) and the neo-Giscar- 
dian UDF (Union pour la D6mocratie Fran~aise). Some two-thirds of the 
French voters who identified with a left-wing party (and almost half of the 
citizens who identified with any party) identified with the Socialist party. 
The largest right-wing party, the RPR, attracted the loyalties of less than 
half of the rightist identifiers, while the UDF enjoyed the allegiance of less 
than a third of them. 
Between the late 1960s and the late 1980s, the underlying pattern of 
party identification in France was transformed. The incidence of party 
identification rose to the level characteristic of other democracies with 
well-established party systems. And the balance of professed partisan at- 
tachments shifted markedly from a virtual left-right standoff to the advan- 
tage of the leftist parties in general and the Socialist party in particular. 
In the absence of comparable measures of party identification in France 
between those two limiting dates, it is impossible to reconstruct in detail 
how the partisan aligaament of 1988 came about. But guided by the cluster 
of theory surrounding the concept of party" identification, and relying on 
our soundings of the French electorate in 1967 and 1988, we can put the 
main pieces of the puzzle together in a way that renders the development 
intelligible. The puzzle itself contains two elements. One is why the inci- 
dence of partisanship rose. The other is why the balance of partisan orien- 
tations moved to the advantage of the Socialist party. 
WHY THE INCIDENCE OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION INCREASED 
It is necessary to distinguish between two main routes toward the acqui- 
sition of a partisan attachment: one that passes through familial political 
socialization, and another that does not. In the former case, children de- 
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velop some sort of political consciousness in response to messages they 
receive from their parents. Later, when these children become adults and 
make an independent entry into political life, they show a high propensity 
to acquire an abiding partisan identification. Children who receive no such 
familial political initiation can, of course, also develop long-term partisan 
attachments, but--at least in France and the United States during the late 
1950s and 1960s--they did so at a considerably lower rate. Powerful forces 
were at work in France during the two decades preceding the presidential 
election of 1988 that almost surely augmented the number of French citi- 
zens who acquired partisan attachments via one route or the other. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the incidence of partisan identification was 
low in France not only because of the size and complexity of the party 
system, but also because a comparatively small proportion of the adults of 
those years experienced familial political socialization when they had been 
children. French families appear to have operated under a reticence norm 
relating to political matters that impeded the development of the kind of 
political orientations that contribute to the acquisition of partisanship in 
young adulthood. This norm was still clearly operative as late as 1970, but 
there was also evidence in the late 1960s to indicate that it was weakening. 8 
By 1988, the French electorate contained a larger proportion of people who 
had received some sort of familial political socialization than had been the 
case in earlier years. 9 As those people tend to acquire a party identification 
more frequently" than people who come from families that are noncom- 
municative politically, the proportion of party identifiers also rose. 
This silent but inexorable impact of changing {~tmilial mores was related 
to other, more obvious forces at work between the late 1960s and the late 
1980s that in all probability contributed to the increase in the incidence of 
party identification among both people who had enjoyed the benefit of 
prior political socialization and those who did not. The most important of 
these is that the level of political interest rose enormously between 1_967 
and 1988. Three times as many people professed having "a lot" of interest 
in politics in 1988 as did so in 1967, while only about one third as many 
indicated that they had no interest in politics at all. Expressed in terms of 
mean scores, political interest rose by about one fifth across the entire 
electorate between 1967 and 1988. 
Some of this increase in political interest was due to the increased educa- 
tion of the 1988 electorate compared with the 1967 one. In 1967, almost 
three-fourths of the electorate had received only a primary school educa- 
tion, while well under 10 percent had gone to a university or other institu- 
tion of higher learning. In 1988, about the same proportion of the popula- 
tion (some 25%) received a higher education as received only a primary 
school education. But greater educational opportunities are not the whole 
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story. Interest in politics increased within every stratum of the population 
in educational terms, If the degree of political interest by educational level 
had remained the same in 1988 as it had been in 1967, overall political 
interest would have increased only by somewhat more than 10 percent 
over the 1967 mean, as compared with the 20-percent increase actually 
recorded. 
Other factors conducive to increasing political interest had to be at work 
also. Almost surely, one of these was increased exposure to television. The 
decade of the 1970s was the period when French homes became saturated 
with television sets. These conveyed political information in an attractively 
packaged form that gained the attention of people {br whom the other mass 
media were either unappealing or unavailable. 
But even more important than the increased flow of information, in our 
opinion, was the simplification of political conflict in France between the 
late 1960s and the late 1980s, as the result of the creation of two broad 
competing electoral coalitions that regularly opposed each other at every 
presidential and legislative election (except the presidential election of 
1969). 
The neatness and clarity of this two-bloc system was a far cry from the 
extremely complicated form that French polities had displayed prior to the 
mid-1960s. Earlier, the party system was highly ffactionalized; unstable 
coalition governments reduced political accountability; and even after the 
establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958, the dimensions of political 
conflict were multiple and various. French citizens thought that there were 
too many political parties; the political scene was too crowded and confus- 
ing to engage the attention of a large fraction of the electorate. 
This situation began to change in the early 1960s, and was completely 
translbrmed at the presidential election of 1965, when the stark second- 
ballot confrontation between Charles de Gaulle and Francois Mitterrand 
symbolized a new kind of polities that was easy for ordinary citizens to 
understand. The creation of a Gaullist bloc, on the one hand, and a leftist 
bloc, on the other hand, produced a pseudo-two-party system that sim- 
plified the political alternatives facing the public. 
Naturally, it took time for this new and more transparent political struc- 
ture to become clearly established in the mass eleetorate's perceptions. 
Inevitably, however, the consistency with which conflict between two co- 
alitions characterized political competition across tile presidential elections 
of 1974 and i981, and the legislative elections of 1973, 1978, and 1981, 
made politics more intelligible and attracted the attention of people who 
would have been discouraged by more complex patterns of the kind that de 
Gaulle had referred to as the "games, poisons and delights" of the system. 
French political elites continued to allow themselves the indulgence of a 
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multiparty system, but its regular division into two competing electoral 
blocs, corresponding to a governing majority and a more or less united 
opposition, conferred a meaning to partisanship that had been lacking be- 
fore. Individual parties could have particular policy preferences and dis- 
tinctive leaders, but each party occupied a clearly visible position within 
one major bloc or the other. For two decades, the French political system 
not only permitted the more involved voters to pick and choose among 
multiple parties on the basis of complex policy formulations, but also en- 
abled the great majority of less sophisticated voters to know where the 
parties stood in the clown-to-earth practical sense of whether they were in 
or out of office and whether they were in favor of or opposed to the highly 
visible national leaders who competed for the presidency. 
The smaller size and the greater simplicity of the French party system of 
the late 1980s compared with that of twenty years earlier are captured 
neatly' in the detailed reports of party identification furnished by the re- 
spondents at our 1988 survey as compared with those of 1967, in response 
to an identical open-ended question. In 1967, 24 categories were required 
to designate the entire universe of discrete parties mentioned by the sam- 
ple electorate; 15 categories were adequate to record the partisan field of 
1988.10 
Furthermore, and related to the smaller number of parties claimed by 
the 1988 respondents as objects of identification, there was less fractionali- 
zation of party identification in 1988 than in 1967. On the basis of the Rae 
(1967) formula for computing party fractionalization, the fractionalization 
index for party identification in France dropped from .78 in 1967 to . 70 in 
1988. That is much higher than the level for the United States, with its 
two-party system, but it is not much higher than the levels for Great Bri- 
tain during the 1980s, when the appearance of the Social Democratic Party 
disturbed the hitherto more or less settled contours of the British party" 
system. H 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE PARTISAN ALIGNMENT 
We have seen that while the incidence of party identification in France 
was rising, the political composition of the partisan alignment was shifting. 
For 1958, at the founding of the Fifth Republic, one cannot even talk about 
a political alignment. In 1967, the Gaullist party was the dominant political 
movement, but the balance between leftist and rightist identifiers was 
more or less equal. By 1988, the Socialist party was the dominant political 
group and leftist identifiers together outnumbered right-wing identifiers by 
a ratio of four to three. 
Traces of this dual chronological development, in the incidence and corn- 
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FIG. 1. Basic political orientations by age (France, 1988). 
position of party identification, show up clearly when we break down the 
1988 distribution of party identification by age. Figure 1 presents that fun- 
damental information, as well as additional data about vaguer forms of po- 
litical positioning (including rei~rences to left-right locations and to political 
leaders) than literal party identifications, so that we can account for all the 
political orientations, however expressed, of each age category repre- 
sented. The age categories themselves are mainly delimited in conven- 
tional decade form, without particular regard to the proportion of the total 
population represented by each category. ~2 At the same time, these age 
categories broadly match the generational layering that is relevant for an 
understanding of the development of party identification in France. 
As Butler and Stokes (1969, p. 59) succinctly put it, when seeking to 
understand the profile of party identification by age, one should not ask 
how old the voters are but rather when it was that they were young. It is 
during one's early, impressionable years that the seeds of political orienta- 
tions are planted. National politics can be dominated by vastly different 
events, conflicts, and personalities from one generation to another, with 
the result that the basic political orientation of one generation will be quite 
distinct from that of another. It is in this context that there is a fortunate 
coincidence between the conventional age categories employed in Figure 1 
to indicate how old the voters were in 1988 and the coherence and dis- 
tinctiveness of the political characteristics of the years when the respon- 
dents falling within each of those age categories "were young." 
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It is, of course, largely in a poetic sense that we speak here of genera- 
tions. These are normally thought of as 30-year spans, and not as decades. 
The term cohort might be more appropriate. Whatever label we use, we 
should be aware that while Butler and Stokes (1969, p. 50n) could make do 
nicely with four cohorts, we have found it most convenient for our pur- 
poses to employ six. That simple difference in analytical categories, as be- 
tween France and Britain, serves to underscore the more frequent under- 
lying discontinuities in political life in France. In defining our cohorts in 
terms appropriate to when they were young, we have chosen--as Butler 
and Stokes did--to do so in terms of "coming of age." Even in this regard, 
there is a slight discontinuity for France: The voting age was reduced from 
21 to 18 in 1974. We have ignored that change, and simply taken the years 
when the respondents in the cohort reached age 18 as the era of socializa- 
tion for each cohort, whether the years involved were before or after 1974. 
As the labels on Figure 1 indicate, each age category represents a distinc- 
tive "generation" in terms of the defining characteristics of the period when 
the respondents within that age bracket came of age. 
The Incidence of Party Identification by Age 
Confining ourselves first to the incidence of party identification, it is 
clear that the highest level occurs for the generation that came of age dur- 
ing what we have labeled tile Gaullist Fifth Republic. These are the people 
whose political initiation took place during the years that encompassed the 
collapse of the Fourth Republic, the return to power of de Gautle, Algerian 
independence, battles over the constitution, and the first modern French 
popular election to the presidency. The voters who were from 40 to 49 
years of age in 1988 constitute the "founding generation" (Carmines, 1991) 
of political conflict in contemporary France, as it is reflected in mass parti- 
san party attachments. We will return to this generation in a slightly differ- 
ent context later in this paper. Here we will add only that when one takes 
other expressed political locations into account as well as discrete part3' 
identifications, the generation of the Gaullist Fifth Republic is the one with 
the fewest people, proportionately, who have no sense at all of their politi- 
cal location. 
The lowest levels of partisanship occur among the older age groups. ~3 
These "generations," whose coming of age occurred during the Fourth Re- 
public, the Second World War and the German occupation, and even the 
Third Republic, are cohorts which, along with their elders of the time, 
contributed to the very low rate of party identification recorded by Con- 
verse and Dupeux (1962) for 1958. Their overall incidence of party identi- 
fication in 1988, although less than the average, was still welt above the 
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mean level of 1958, a clear indication that adult French citizens were tak- 
ing on partisan identifications at a higher rate during the Fifth Republic 
than they had done earlier. 
The intermediate cohorts, in terms of the incidence of party identifica- 
tion, are those who came of age during the early post-Gaullist Fifth Repub- 
lic and what we have labeled the mature Fifth Republic. The formative 
political experiences of these two generations naturally differed in their 
specifics, but they had in common the strong and eventually victorious 
efforts of the leftist forces to oust de Gautle and his successors from power. 
These are the voters whose political environment was characterized most 
consistently and exclusively by the clarity and simplicity of the two-bloc, 
pseudo-two-party system that emerged during the mid-1960s. Indeed, the 
younger of the two cohorts in this category, the one born between 1959 
and 1970, includes children of people from the cohort that came of age 
during the battles of the Gaullist Fifth Republic. The respondents in our 
youngest cohort not only had the opportunity to absorb the neat and clear 
political atmospherics of the mature Fifth Republic, but they also were 
likely to have experienced parental partisan "pushes" from the people who 
constitute the founding generation of contemporary French mass partisan- 
ship. In that fashion, the intensity of the political conflicts that were the 
hallmarks of the Gaullist Fifth Republic are wedded to the greater ease of 
situating oneself in partisan terms that has been characteristic of the years 
of the mature Fifth Republic. 
The Composition of the Partisan Alignment by Age 
Leftist party identifiers outnumber rightist identifiers in four of our six 
age cohorts. Leftists are most numerous in the generation of the early post- 
Ganllist Fifth Republic, and next most prevalent among the youngest of the 
cohorts, that of the mature Fifth Republic.~4 In terms of formative political 
experience, therefore, the years of leftist challenges and defeats during the 
late 1960s and the 1970s spawned more left-wing party identifiers than the 
more recent period of leftist electoral victories. The lesser, although still 
substantial, lead of the left over the right in party identification among the 
respondents who were in their 50s and 60s at the time of our survey in 
1988 reflects the close balance of left and right party identifications that we 
recorded in 1967. People in those age groups would have been in their 30s 
and 40s in 1967 and, therefore, contributing to the dead heat as between 
leftist and rightist party identifiers at that time (within a lower overall inci- 
dence of party identification than in 1988). The recorded 1988 levels of 
leftist party identification among those cohorts may be understood as a re- 
flection of the left-right standoff of 1967, plus an increment of some 5 per- 
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cent in favor of the left in harmony with the ongoing leftist surge of the last 
decade. 
It should be noted that if we take into account not only discrete party 
identifications but also the "other" expressions of political positions that are 
recorded in Figure 1 (and that overwhelmingly include references to left- 
right locations), the left-right balance is very close among the respondents 
who were in their 50s or 60s in 1988. The relatively large proportions of 
rightist respondents who designated themselves in these broader terms re- 
flects the absence in 1988 of surviving partisan referents from the eras dur- 
ing which they came of political age. 
The only cohort in which rightist party identifiers outnumbered leftist 
ones in 1988 is the 40-49-year-old group, which came of age during the 
Gaullist Fifth Republic. This finding is noteworthy for two reasons. On the 
one hand, this is the generation that contains most of the people who were 
young adults in 1968, the year of the now legendary anti-Gaullist mass 
upheaval that ranks with the Paris Commune and the sit-down strikes of 
1936 in the mythology of the French left. The people in this cohort were 
between 20 and 29 years of age during the events of May 1968. On the 
other hand, there is a sharp difference in the ratio of leftist to rightist party 
identifiers as between the 40-49-year-old cohort and the next younger co- 
hort (ages 30-39 in 1988). The 40-49 group is the most rightist generation, 
while the 30-39 cohort is the most leftist. At least the oldest members of 
the latter cohort had also been young adults in 1968. These two aspects of 
our data raise the question of what the legacy of the 1968 events was in the 
context of French mass partisanship 20 years later. 
To find the answer to that question, we pursued the traces of 1968 more 
finely than Figure 1 alone permits by examining the distribution of basic 
partisan identifications within the relevant age groups on an annual basis. 
This distribution appears in Figure 2, in the form of the proportion of true 
identifiers with leftist parties less the proportion of true identifiers with 
rightist parties, by age in 1988, among all respondents in each annual co- 
hort. In order to compensate for the thin case numbers that annualization 
produces, as well as to smooth out the curve slightly, we employed a three- 
year moving average. Each "annual cohort," therefore, is the mean of three 
adjacent annual cohorts. This procedure yields 3-year totals that are mainly 
in the 60s and 70s, and always more than 50, for respondents ages 30 to 43 
in 1988. The totals for respondents ages 44 to 50 are all less than 50, and 
include some that are in the low 30s and high 20s. 
Despite the risks of sampling error, particularly among the older cohorts 
displayed, one cannot fail to be impressed by the steep slope of the curve 
that occupies the middle third of Figure 2. The implications of that slope 
and its location are so consistent with party identification theory', the local 
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FIG. 2. Trends in balance of party identification among respondents aged 30-50 
(France, 1988). 
French historical facts, and comparable phenomena that have been re- 
ported for the United States that we feel justified, at least provisionally, in 
setting aside concerns about sampling error and concentrating our attention 
on the conspicuously coherent display of data. 
Let us be clear about where Figure 2 fits into our discussion about the 
development of party identification in France, and what, more exactly, it 
tells us. We know that in the past there have been two broad types of 
partisan configuration. One, which was measured during the late 1960s, 
showed leftist and rightist party identifiers to be in a more or less equal 
balance; the other, captured in 1988, was characterized by a clear predomi- 
nance of leftist identifiers over rightist ones. These may be thought of as 
two plateaus of different heights. 
The residues of these two plateaus, in the form of current (1988) party 
identifications, appear quite clearly in Figure 1. What does not appear in 
Figure 1 is the nature and timing of the connection between the two 
plateaus. It is Figure 2 that supplies us with that information, and it does 
so with uncommon clarity. The two plateaus are present there in somewhat 
ragged form, but now we see that they are connected to each other by a 
steep cliff that was chiseled into the French partisan landscape by people 
who were between 18 and 24 years of age in 1968. The importance of the 
1968 upheaval as a great realigning event is strikingly affirmed. The central 
role of the youngest voters as the avant-garde of the new alignment is also 
unambiguously displayed. 
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These findings mesh admirably with analogous results reported long ago 
for the United States. In their classic work, The American Voter, Campbell 
et al. (1960, p. 154) charted the direction of party identification, by year of 
birth between 1900 and 1930, for some 10,000 cases from seven U.S. Na- 
tional Election Studies conducted between 1952 and 1958. That chart sim- 
ilarly displayed two plateaus of unequal heights joined by a steep cliff (in 
the Democratic direction) centering on voters born between 1905 and 
1912, indicating strongly that the New Deal realignment had been spear- 
headed by voters who were between 21 and 27 years old in 1932. 
Converse (1976) later developed that analysis more powerfhlly and ele- 
gantly. On the one hand, he enlarged the case numbers and extended the 
time frame of the display of party identification by year of birth, and on 
that basis showed that the age-localization of the depression-era realign- 
ment in the United States increasingly lost sharpness of definition with the 
passage of time, even though it remained apparent from traces into the 
1970s that something important had happened among people who entered 
the electorate during the 1930s (1976, pp. 132-135). On the other hand, by 
correlating party identifications, by annualized age, with aggregate elec- 
toral outcomes for biennial U.S. elections, he showed that the optimal cor- 
relations for the period 1952-1958 (the same years charted in The Ameri- 
can Voter) occurred for voters between 21 and 22 years of age (1976, pp. 
132-137). Between 1964 and 1972, the optimal fit would still have been for 
age 22, although for that later period the range of variation was such that 
any age between 22 and 26 would have been almost as good. 
These findings are directly relevant to the interpretation of our French 
data. Given that the clarity of earlier realignments progressively deterio- 
rates in later expressions of partisanship, our 1988 portrayal of the 1968 
French realignment should be more sharply etched than the rendition of 
the U.S. realignment that appears in The American Voter, While our anal- 
ysis suffers by comparison with respect to case numbers, it gains in imme- 
diacy with regard to the lapse of time between the realigning event and the 
later distribution of partisan identifications by age. Our 1988 measurements 
of partisanship occurred a mere 20 years after the realigning upheaval of 
1968. The original graph in The American Voter was based on pooled data 
gathered from 20 to 26 years after the realigning depression, with the re- 
sult that the contours of the "cliff' rising upward to the new Democratic 
plateau were already becoming blurred. The best estimate that one can 
make simply by eyeballing the graph is that the realignment centered on 
the 24-year-olds of the era. We know from Converse's later analysis, how- 
ever, that the cutting edge of change was the 21- and 22-year-olds. Our 
finding for France is that the age range that took the lead in scaling the 
new leftist rampart was from 18 to 24, which of course centers on 21! It is 
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worth recalling in this connection that during the late 1960s and early 
1970s the minimum voting age in France was still 21. 
Having placed our French data within a larger, comparative perspective, 
we are in a position to give a clear answer to the question about the politi- 
cal legacy of the May 1968 upheaval with which we opened this section of 
our analysis. The 1968 revolt was a realigning event in France analogous-- 
at least within a term of 20 years--to the great depression of the 1930s in 
the United States. The leftist dominance in partisan attachments that we 
found in 1988 had its origins in the May days of 1968, just as the longer- 
term Democratic party ascendancy in the U.S. emerged from the great 
depression. L5 
The residues of that new French alignment that we find in the distribu- 
tion of partisanship, measured 20 years after the aligning event itself, indi- 
cate that the shift in the partisan balance that occurred was led by the 
youngest cohort of voters, just as the youngest voters had spearheaded the 
New Deal realigmnent in the United States some 35 years earlier. That is 
exactly what we would expect on the basis of the theory of partisanship. 
The youngest voters are, other things being equal, less firmly anchored in 
the party system than their elders, and they are, consequently, more sus- 
ceptible to change in reaction to destabilizing shocks to the ongoing party 
system. 
Before we leave Figure 2, there is one more comment to be made, albeit 
with added caution, as it refers to the right-hand third of the figure, where 
case numbers are perilously thin. While our 1988 respondents who had 
been between 18 and 24 years old in 1968 form the cliff that rises to the 
leftist plateau, there are indications that the slightly older voters, those 
who had been between 24 and 27, were actually moving rightward at the 
same time. That might be merely a trick played by sampling en'or, but it is 
in no way inconsistent with the actual events of 1968. There were, after all~ 
two sides to the 1968 revolt, On the one hand, deep hostility toward the 
Gaullist regime produced weeks of near-general strikes and massive dem- 
onstrations. But there was also a sharp backlash against the disorders asso- 
ciated with the anti-Gaullist demonstrations that produced a right-wing 
landslide at the legislative elections of 1968. We know that in the immedi- 
ate wake of the May events, more voters shifted rightward than moved 
leftward (Converse and Pierce, 1986, pp. 431-436). 
It is not out of the question that while the 1968 revolt put an indelible 
stamp on the cohort that was between 18 and 27 years old at the time, it 
did so in internally contradictory ways, with the younger elements of that 
thin population slice being imprinted by an impulse toward radicalism and 
the older ones by the backlash. Such an interpretation gains plausibility by 
the fact that the older segment of the cohort would have been approaching 
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the age when young adults begin to take on responsibilities that require 
order and a stable environment. But this subplot, even if sustained, is only 
a refinement alongside the central message that emerges from Figure 2: 
The 1968 upheaval was a realigning event of historic proportions that cen- 
tered on the youngest voters. 
It is important to add, in any case, that the youngest cohort could not 
alone be responsible for the new leftist predominance in partisanship that 
was registered in France in 1988, any more than the youngest U.S. voters 
alone produced the post-1932 Democratic majority. The youngest voters in 
both countries were only the leading edges of what were broad period 
effects. The leading edge in France remained finely honed and optimally 
centered after a lapse of two decades, But the increase in leftist partisan- 
ship after 1968 was distributed broadly throughout the entire electorate, 
and particularly among voters who were too young to have been soixante- 
huitards (sixty-eighters). 
The 1968 upheaval was a major turning point, but other forces also had 
to be operating on popular political orientations. The most important of 
these were the decline of Gaullism as the principal pole of attraction on the 
right, and the growth of the Socialist party into the main magnet on the 
political left. These dual developments were directly linked to the strategic 
roles played by the two presidential protagonists of 1965, Charles de 
Gaulle and Francois Mitterrand. 
Contrasting Leadership Styles 
De Oaulle's defeat at the referendum of 1969, followed immediately by 
his resignation from the presidency and by his death the following year, left 
the Gaullist party that had been fbunded by his supporters in 1958 disori- 
ented and dispirited. The party was surely not leaderless, but its habit of 
dependence on and obedience to de Gaulle had left it without the experi- 
ence, temperament, or even mechanisms to produce a new leadership from 
its own ranks whom the party's numerous heavyweights could support. 
Pompidou became de Gaulle's immediate heir because he had been his 
prime minister, and not because he was the choice of calculating party 
leaders. When Pompidou's death opened up the succession once again, the 
Gaullists could not find a candidate capable of uniting their party. The 
candidate who formally ran under the Gaullist banner--Jacques Chaban- 
Delmas--did not outdistance Valdry Giscard d'Estaing at the first ballot of 
the 1974 presidential election. Gaullist dominance of the right came to an 
end. 
After Giscard's electoral victory, the French right reverted to the splin- 
tered state it had been in before it was quasi-unified under the aegis of de 
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Gaulle. Gaullist electoral fortunes ebbed during the 1970s and 1980s, while 
those of their Giscardian rivals gained, until the two right-wing groups 
were of about equal voting strength. Hardly distinguishable from each 
other in broad programmatic terms, they were constantly jockeying for pre- 
eminence over each other. The Giscardians themselves were a loose feder- 
ation of rival groupings. The salience that the GauUist party" once enjoyed 
as the lodestone of the right evaporated. 
Even if the Gaullist party had fared better electorally after de Gaulle's 
departure than it actually did, there is reason to believe that mass attach- 
ments to the party would have dissipated at more than a random rate. De 
Ganlle's withdrawal from the political scene was far more than the passing 
of a popular party leader. De Gaulle's personal appeal was greater than that 
of the party that formed to support him. Large numbers of the general's 
admirers flocked to the Gaullist party because it was identified with him. 
When de Gaulle left the scene, his party" was vulnerable to the loss of that 
vast conditional element of its foundation. French voters could, did, and 
still do identify with the Ganllist party for a variety of reasons, but the 
personal appeal of de Gaulte could not survive him indefinitely. 
Even when he was active, de Gaulle did virtually nothing to contribute 
to the permanence of a Gaullist party. De Gaulle despised parties, and 
there is no reason to believe that he made any exception for the Gaullists, 
when they behaved like a party, as opposed simply to supporting his posi- 
tions, which he always presented as expressions of the national interest. De 
Ganlle regularly took a stance "above parties," which was hardly conducive 
to encouraging long-term attachments to any party, even the one that 
claimed to be his own. It was, in part, de Gaulle's "above-parties" posture 
that helped him to build personal popular support that was broader and 
deeper than that earned by the Gaullist party, but that aspect of his appeal 
made it all the more dit~cult for his admirers to transfer their allegiance to 
the Gaullist party', which in any case was bound to emerge diminished once 
the general was not longer there as a source of reflected glory, 
While de Gaulle's disappearance ended the Gaullist hegemony on the 
right, Francois Mitterrand's advent to the leadership of the Socialist party 
set it on a course that culminated with that party's domination of the 
French left. The Gaullists, at the end of the 1960s, had succeeded in be- 
coming virtually synonymous with the right, only to lose that status during 
the 1980s, when they fimnd it difficult even to maintain parity of popular 
support with their Giscardian rivals. The Socialists, by way of contrast, 
began that same period weaker than the Communists, who were the major 
political force on the left, but they ended up barely a decade later not only 
as France's main left-wing party but as its largest party of any kind. 
This outcome was the result of the appropriateness of Mitterrand's politi- 
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cal strategy for a period when the appeal of the right was waning and anti- 
Communist sentiment was intensifying. Mitterrand's strategy was to iden- 
tify the Socialist party unmistakably with the "left" by allying with the 
Communists under an agreement according to which each party would 
throw its support at the second ballot of France's two-ballot elections to the 
candidate of the leftist party that was best-placed to win.~6 This strategy' 
required a Communist party that was sufficiently respectable not to make 
such a leftist alliance out of the question (as had been the case in 1969, in 
the wake of the Warsaw Pact countries' invasion of Czechoslovakia), but 
still frightening enough to give opposition-minded voters a real incentive to 
support the Socialists instead. The Communists providentially obliged, by 
taking only superficial steps to distance themselves from the characteristic 
features of Russian policy. They remained organizationally in the Stalinist 
mold and manifested only a slow, incomplete and grudging acceptance of 
the "Eurocommunist'" principles that were rapidly acquiring standing in 
other Western European Communist parties. In these circumstances, the 
Socialist party became the main point of attraction for voters who sought 
radical economic and social reforms but who also distrusted the Communist 
party. 
As the main beneficiary of discontent with right-wing rule, the Socialist 
party regularly outdistanced its Communist allies at the first ballot of legis- 
lative elections, and the terms of the alliance became increasingly favorable 
to the Socialists. What was in principle a system of mutual assistance be- 
came mainly a conduit for the flow of Communist votes in support of So- 
cialist candidates at the second ballot, as the proportion of districts in 
which Communists ran ahead of Socialists at the first ballot decreased dur- 
ing the 1970s and t980s. 
Furthermore, Mitterrand had no reservations about trying to convert 
whatever personal appeal he could muster to the advantage of the Socialist 
party. While de Gaulle styled himself as above parties, Mitterrand was 
conspicuously partisan. He worked and schemed tirelessly, not only in his 
party but also for his party. In this regard, Mitterrand's behavior could 
hardly" have been more different from that of de Gautle, and the results in 
terms of personal as compared with partisan political identifications are 
strikingly" different as "well. In 1968, shortly after the Gaullist party" won the 
greatest electoral victory of its history, almost half as many respondents in 
the Converse/Pierce survey claimed to be "Gaullists" or identified with "De 
Gaulle's party" as professed an identification with some nominal variant of 
the Gaullist party. At our 1988 sample survey, conducted in association 
with Mitterrand's triumphant reelection to the presidency, a mere handful 
of respondents replied that they identified with "Mitterrand" or "Mitter- 
rand's party," as compared with the more than one third who claimed an 
attachment to the Socialist party. 
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The Socialist party had the good fortune of being in the ascendancy when 
the level of political interest was rising, partisan choices were becoming 
simpler and clearer, familial political socialization was widening, and the 
overall incidence of party identification was increasing. During the late 
1960s, the French Socialist party was somewhat less visible than the Gaul- 
list UNR and considerably less visible than the Communist party (Converse 
and Pierce, 1986, p. 62). By 1988, the Socialist party was almost surely the 
most visible party on the French political horizon. Exercising the widest 
field of attraction, the Socialists were in a position to profit most from tile 
increasing proportion of citizens that were receptive to partisan persuasion. 
The main source of Socialist party identifiers was, of course, the successive 
younger "generations," but the data in Figure 1 show that the left had also 
won at least the temporary allegiance of voters from older generations that 
had been immune to partisan appeals in their youth. 
DISCUSSION 
As we indicated at the outset of this paper, our investigation has two sets 
of implications: one relating specifically to the French political landscape, 
the other to the theory of elections that centers around the concept of party 
identification. With regard to the former, the main lesson is that the parti- 
san alignment whose development and contours we have traced was vul- 
nerable to any undoing of the conditions that created it. With respect to 
the theory of elections more broadly, our findings lead to some concluding 
comments about the conditions of a basic partisan alignment. 
The Fragility of the Partisan Alignment 
The two most prominent characteristics of the 1988 French partisan 
alignment are that it was comparatively new, having been formed only dur- 
ing the two decades between 1967 and 1988, and that its political composi- 
tion was shaped mainly by the partisan identifications of the younger citi- 
zens. These two {batures, which are related to each other, mean that the 
foundation of the alignment was less than solid and its duration uncertain. 
The gradient in strength of party identification by age was the same in 
France in 1988 as it normally is in a developed system: Party identification 
was weakest among the young and generally intensified with age, except 
for the most elderly cohort. ~ The probability that people would abandon or 
switch their partisan attachment was, therefore, highest for the voters un- 
der 40 years of age who contributed so heavily in 1988 to both the new 
equilibrium level of party identification in France and its sharply leftist 
orientation. Furthermore, inasmuch as it is not biological age per se but 
rather length of systemic experience that affects the intensification of party 
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identification, the predominantly leftist party identifications acquired in re- 
cent years by older members of the electorate were similarly more suscep- 
tible to change than they would have been if they had been acquired ear- 
lier in life. 
The factors that could contribute to disturbing the 1988 alignment were 
the same as those that were for so long the main obstacle to the formation 
of any partisan alignment at all: the tendency for the political elites to keep 
tinkering with the political supply and obscuring the objects of partisan 
choice. Those propensities are more characteristic of rightist and centrist 
leaders than of leftists, but no segment of the political spectrum has been 
immune from splintering, the launching of new parties, or the formation of 
temporary electoral alliances under new names. 
The risk was not that the incidence of party identification would recede 
to its lower levels of two or three decades earlier. That is not impossible, 
but it is highly unlikely, given that party identification had reached the 
equilibrium level, and in view of the weakening of the reticence norm that 
formerly impeded the intergenerational transmission of partisanship (Per- 
cheron, 1989). 
The greater probability was an increase in instability of partisan identi- 
fications at the individual level beyond the expected rate for a party system 
of the size of the French one. If new parties continued to emerge, old ones 
splintered, fractious leaders complicated the partisan field, and complex 
coalition strategies obscured the meaning of electoral choices, it could be 
expected that movements into and out of partisan identifications would ac- 
celerate, along with switches from identification with one party to identi- 
fication with another, 
The party that had the most to lose from such a development was, of 
course, the Socialist party, as it was the one that gained the most during 
the years when the party system stabilized and the incidence of party iden- 
tification rose. In these circumstances, it was particularly important for the 
party to contain its divisions and leadership rivalries, notably in the even- 
tual selection of a successor to Frangois Mitterrand as party leader and 
presidential candidate. If the Socialists could manage their internal ten- 
sions without damaging the clarity and constancy of their public image, 
they had a chance to succeed where the right in general and the Ganllists 
in particular had failed so badly after the departure of de Gaulle. 
A measure of the political treasure that the rightist parties squandered 
after 1969 appears in the data displayed in Figure 1 for the respondents 
who were in their 40s in 1988, whom we have labeled the generation of the 
Gaullist Fifth Republic. They constitute the only cohort that is more right- 
ist than leftist in diserete party identifications, and the rightist party identi- 
fiers in that cohort are more strongly attached to their parties than either 
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leftists or rightists of any other cohort.~s The squabbling right-wing parties 
were less attractive to the following generations, and they entered into a 
long series of hollow years. 
But if there was some possibility that the French Socialist party after 
1988 might avoid the fate of the Gaullists after 1968, it is also true that they 
could control their own fortunes only to a limited extent. The main argu- 
ment of this article is that the generation of a partisan alignment in France 
by 1988 was the result of a set of systemic factors having to do with the 
simplification, clarification, and stabilization of the-entire party system. 
This was a result to which all the major parties contributed, even if it was 
the Socialists who by 1988 had most prospered from it. For twenty years, 
there were symmetrical electoral alliances on both left and right, and com- 
paratively homogeneous governments faced similarly united oppositions. 
By 1988, when we took the reading of the distribution of partisan identi- 
fications that both reflected and contributed to' that partisan structure, the 
pseudo-two-party system was already unraveling, and it would continue to 
do so. As the dominance of the two-bloc system eroded, new political en- 
trepreneurs could be expected to multiply their efforts to upset the fragile 
equilibrium that had been two decades in the making. 
The Conditions of a Partisan Alignment 
This article directs attention to the question of how a partisan alignment 
is formed where there was none before, even though there was an ongoing 
party system. This is a dit~rent issue from the one that has tended to 
attract the interest of students of party systems in recent years. These have 
been concerned primarily with the patterns and processes of dealignment 
or realignment, both of which are developments that assume the prior ex- 
istence of some kind of alignment from which the electorate might deviate. 
The distinct object of our investigation has led us to focus on the attrib- 
utes of the ongoing party system, and more particularly, on the changes 
that occurred in it more or less coincidentally with the development of not 
a new but rather an original partisan alignment. That, too, is a departure 
from the main features of most contemporary accounts of partisan align- 
ments. These attribute central importance to basic social cleavages or the 
crystallization of a powerful new issue agenda (Dalton, 1988; Carmines, 
1991). 
We do not mean to suggest by omission that social cleavages are not 
fundamental to the party system, or that major issues are irrelevant to the 
electoral fortunes of the various parties that populate that system. Indeed, 
we have emphasized the critical role of the 1968 upheaval in the emer- 
gence of the new alignment, and the primacy of the youngest voters in 
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shaping a new partisan configuration. Issues were certainly not foreign to 
those major events, but while they eventually had to be expressed in con- 
crete form for policy-making purposes (Converse and Pierce, 1986, pp. 
730-738), they were highly diffuse and buried in broader ideologic~ slo- 
gans while the May 1968 events were actually unfolding. We do, however, 
believe that to focus on the nature of the cleavages or the substance of the 
issues would be to put the cart before the horse. A prior condition of the 
operative effect of social cleavages and major issues on the fate of the par- 
ties in any system is that the parties be clearly perceived by the voters in 
those terms. In France, the site of our investigation, the fundamental soci- 
etal cleavages and major issues have been present for a long time, but they 
did little until recently to stabilize the party system or to contribute to the 
formation of a partisan alignment. We have, therefore, concentrated on the 
clarity and constancy of the party system rather than on the character of the 
parties' social support (except ~br age) or on the content of current issues. 
The simplification and stabilization of the party system made the develop- 
ment of a partisan alignment possible, and an alignment would have been 
formed whatever the issues might have been, although these naturally af- 
fect the balance of underlying partisan strength. 
The importance of the structure and character of party systems for the 
development of partisan alignments will be increasingly apparent as the 
numerous new democratic systems that are in the process of formation 
struggle to find some sort of stable foundations. The new regimes that are 
emerging in the wake of the current sweep of global democratization will 
be prey to a host of problems inherited from the past and preparatory for 
the future. They can, in the best of circumstances, be expected to be 
highly unstable. They are the more likely to achieve some stable flow of 
communications between the mass electorate and the governing elites if 
these latter show restraint and self-discipline in their control of the supply 
side of the partisan market. 
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NOTES 
1. The actual comparison was between French voters from 1967 to 1968, and U.S. voters 
from 1956 to 1958, and from 1958 to 1960. Those were years when net aggregate electoral 
stability was atypically high for France and low for the U.S., so some caution is called for 
in generalization from the findings, but the underlying message that constancy of partisan 
choice requires constancy of partisan offerings is irrefutable. 
2. This does not mean that every party had an equal probability of winning the support of 
the voters who were not already attached to a particular party. For many people who did 
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not identify with a discrete party, certain other parties--qotably the Communist par ty--  
might be pariahs. Still other people might be guided by their religions outlook, or a sense 
of left-right location, or sympathy for certain social groups (workers, small business). But 
for those people, the electoral problem included the far from trivial task of identifying 
which of tile large array of contending parties most closely matched whatever more gen- 
eral, politically relevant orientation they might have. 
3. For the cvntrary view, see Lewis-Beck (1984, pp. 428-433, 447). Chariot (1986, p. 6) 
reports the results of a series of French surveys purporting to measure the incidence of 
party identification. Most employed the interview method of giving the respondents a list 
of parties fi'om which to choose and produce characteristically inflated results. Charlot 
does not report the question wording, but consistency here is also essential. For the 
question wording used to measure "partisan proximity" in France in 1978, see Cap- 
devielle et al. (1981, p. 22n). For additional considerations concerning problems of ascer- 
taining party identification in France, see Converse and Pierce (1986, Chap. 3, n. 7). 
4. The author is happy to acknowledge the support of grant SES-8801639 from the National 
Science Foundation, as well as fnrther support from SOFRES, the French Cultural Serv- 
ices of Chicago, Illinois, and The French-American Foundation. 
5. In order to eliminate the possibility that interviewers might translate unintelligible re- 
ports of partisan attachments into some credible version, Converse and Pierce contracted 
for special interviewer training for their surveys in the late 1960s. Resource limitations 
ruled out special interviewer training for the 1988 study, but the printed questionnaires 
used by the interviewers contained this special instruction, alongside the question relat- 
ing to party identification, and printed in large, conspicuously boldface type: "Enqu~teur: 
Ne Rien Sugg6rer. Noter de fa~on tr~s prOcise ce que vous dit l'interview~ m~me s ice  
n'est pas le nora d'un parti." (Interviewer: Do not suggest anything. Note down exactly 
what the respondent tells yon even if it is not the name of a party.) 
6. Converse's calculations were based on a turnover model that assumed the probability of a 
person acquiring a partisan attachment was. 8 if that person was raised in a partisan family 
and only ,5 if the person was reared in an apolitical family. Those cenditional probabilities 
had been empirically determined ~br both France and the United States during the 1950s 
(Converse, 1969). 
7. A literal application of Converse's turnover model, taking the 30-year lapse between 1958 
and 1988 as a sin~e generation, and assuming that the incidence of party identification in 
t958 was 53 percent, produces a 1988 level of 66 percent, somewhat lower than our 
reported incidence. But given changing patterns of familial political socialization during 
recent decades (Percheron, 1989), we should not be surprised that party identifications 
would accumulate at a somewhat faster rate than Converse's model assumes. 
8. These matters are spelled out in detail in Converse and Pierce (1986, Chap. 3). 
9. Percheron (1989, p. 84) reports that between 1975 and 1989, there was a dAdramatisation 
of politics within the family: "Political choices departed from everyone's secret garden, 
from the domain of silence." 
10. There is some room for debate over what is a "discrete party." For 1967, we included 
references to "Gaullist" and "Giscardian" in the partisan inventory; for 1988, we excluded 
references to leaders. For both years, we have excluded references to left-right locations 
and to groups that are clearly not parties. 
11. See Converse and Pierce (1986, pp. 91-93) for a comparison of the fractionalization of the 
French party system of the late 1960s with that of the party systems of the U.S., Great 
Britain, and the Netherlands at more or less the same time period, 
12. On the general question of the criteria for establishing age categories for political analysis, 
see Percheron (1988). 
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13. Except for the group ages 18 to 20 in 1988, not shown separately in Figure 1, among 
whom less than 63 percent identified with a party. 
14. But not, however, among the very youngest. Among the thin population slice ages 18 to 
20, right-wing identifiers outnumber leftists. 
15. The protest movements in the United States during the 1960s had a different kind of 
effect on the distribution of partisanship. Jennings and Markus (1984) found that the main 
political difference between graduating high school students in 1965 and their parents was 
that the former were less likely to identify with any party, a difference that endured into 
the early 1980s. But as the comparison between children and parents connotes, that was 
essentially a generational effect, without any marked resonance among other age groups. 
A graphing of the proportion of persons in the U.S. having a party identification (i.e., 
excluding leaners and independents) in 1988, by annualized age, shows no "cliff' connect- 
ing two plateaus of different heights. Of course, the protest movement in the U.S. did not 
have the magnitude, breadth of social support, ideological inspiration, concentration, and 
explosiveness that characterized the French upheaval of May 1968. 
16. See Schlesinger and Schlesinger (1990) for a discussion of how French parties adapt to the 
exigencies and opportunities of the two-ballot electoral system. 
17. The only exception was that 40-49-year-old identifiers felt closer to their parties than the 
50-59-year-olds, largely because of the strength of right-wing partisan attachments within 
the "founding generation.'" 
18. This helps to explain the larger proportion of rightist than leftist identifiers in 1988 among 
the 18-20-year-olds, who are among the children of the most right-wing 1988 cohort. 
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